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CULTURAL CONVENTION AND LEGITIMATE LAW
ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM*

Any view about the nature of law in the United States depends
on a view about the nature of law; any view about the nature of
morality in the United States depends on a view about the nature of
morality; and any view about the connection between morality and
law in the United States depends on a view about the connection
between morality and law. Richard Markovits presents an intriguing
and nuanced account of morally legitimate legal argument in the
culture of the United States.' I wish to make more explicit and
examine the general view of morally legitimate law on which his
views about American morality and law depend.
Much of what Markovits concludes about the moral obligations
of individuals and governments in the United States is correct: there
are internally-right answers to moral-rights questions in our culture,
the basic moral principle in our culture is a version of liberalism, and
in our culture the right is prior to the good. But this is all so because
there are right answers to moral-rights questions, a version of
liberalism is morally required of any culture, and in any culture the
right is prior to the good.
Markovits believes that moral obligations get their normative
force from social convention, and I do not. Perhaps because
foundational questions in moral theory are beyond the scope of his
current work, he does not argue for moral conventionalism but from
it. He sets out to show that it follows from conventionalism and from
certain descriptive facts about our moral practices that there are
internally-right answers to legal rights questions in the United
States-what he calls the right answer thesis. I, too, will duck the
foundational question. The philosophical literature on conventionalism and other forms of moral relativism is well-worked, and though,
as I said, I believe that Markovits's starting point is mistaken, I will
* Associate Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
1. See RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: LEGITIMATE LEGAL
ARGUMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1998) [hereinafter MOP]; Richard S.
Markovits, Legitimate Legal Argument and Internally-RightAnswers to Legal-Rights Questions,
74 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 415 (1999) [hereinafter LLA].
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not rehearse the arguments against it here.2 Rather, I wish to show
that his conclusions about legitimate legal argument in the United
States do not follow from his conventionalism, at least not in the way
that he supposes.
Markovits's starting point is this: "Using a particular type of
argument to determine the content of existing law is morally
legitimate in a given culture if and only if doing so is consistent with
'3
that culture's moral commitments.
The two crucial phrases, "morally legitimate in a given culture"
and "that culture's moral commitments," must be parsed with care.
Are "morally" and "moral" here used with anthropological
detachment, merely describing the behaviors or beliefs of a culture, or
are they meant to have genuine prescriptive or evaluative force? On
one read, the proposition is a descriptive tautology: a culture
considers certain legal arguments morally legitimate (whether
mistaken about that or not) if and only if those arguments are
consistent with what that culture considers to be morally legitimate.
Now, this clearly is not what Markovits means, but the misreading
points out how treacherous the footing of moral language is in the
presence of cultural language.
On another read, the proposition is an empirical claim about the
connection between a culture's beliefs (whether mistaken or not)
about the moral legitimacy of legal argument and its beliefs (whether
mistaken or not) about other aspects of morality. This too is a
misreading. For, though a culture's moral commitments are a matter
of descriptive fact known through anthropological observation,
Markovits holds that these facts are the source of genuine moral
obligation for members of that culture. On his view (apart from a
caveat discussed below), a culture's descriptive moral commitments
cannot be mistaken, for collectively thinking that a principle morally
obligates makes it morally obligate.
The reading Markovits intends is something like this (though this
is my formulation, not his):
(a) Legal practices and decision makers in a culture make claims
about what types of arguments are the correct ones to use in
deciding what the law is, but they can be mistaken. Mistaken
arguments are likely to lead to mistaken decisions about the law,
2. For a fair-minded recent treatment and helpful references, see T.M. SCANLON, WHAT
WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 328-61 (1998).
3. LLA, supra note 1, at 417. Similarly, see MOP, supra note 1, at 1, 12,135.
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and when they do, the result is a moral mistake that does not
4
have the genuine normative force of morally legitimate law.
Legal practice, says Markovits, is not "self-legitimating." 5
(b) A legal argument is morally legitimate in a culture if and only if
it is consistent with the normatively correct moral principles or
values that apply in that culture. A legal argument can fail to be
consistent with normatively correct moral principles or values,
and so fail to be a morally legitimate legal argument.
(c) A moral principle or value is normatively correct in a culture if
and only if it is a descriptively correct moral principle or value of
that culture-a principle or value that, as a matter of empirical
fact, the culture considers to be normatively correct. A culture
can never be mistaken about what are normatively correct moral
principles or values in that culture, for the correct ones are
whatever the culture is committed to. Markovits does not say it
this way, but moral practice, as opposed to legal practice, is selflegitimating.
There are two exceptions to step (c). The first is a requirement of
coherence. The observed moral practices of a culture could contain
some noise and dissonance, so anthropological observation must be
aided by interpretive inferences to clean up gaps and inconsistencies.
The second exception is that not just anything can count as a moral
value. Markovits doesn't say which attributes are necessary for a
purported moral value to be a moral value. These requirements might
be formal, like coherence, or they might be substantive limitations on
what counts as a moral principle or value. 6 Perhaps here lurks a moral
theory that seriously limits the scope of convention. But even though
not anything goes, a lot goes. If a culture denies that there are any
individual moral rights at all and commits itself to glorify the one true
god or to realize moral perfection or to pursue national honor, then,
on Markovits's view, members of that culture are morally bound by
such values.
To be legitimate, the use of a particular type of legal argument
must be consistent with the moral commitments of the culture in
which it is made. In a goal-based culture, the use of the relevant

4. It is beyond the scope of Markovits's argument to say what follows from a conclusion
that a legal decision is illegitimate. Presumably, it follows that there is no moral obligation to
obey such a decision for the reason that it is legitimate law, for the decision is not legitimate law.
But there may be other moral reasons to obey even illegitimate legal decisions.
5. MOP, supra note 1, at 3, 13,61.
6. See id. at 22, 191-93.
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type of argument
must promote the goals the society is committed
7
to achieving.
Markovits also recognizes one important qualification to step (a).
"The exception to my claim that arguments of moral principle
dominate the other forms of legal argument relates to textual argument: the plain meaning of a Constitutional text that was understood
by its ratifiers dominates arguments of moral principle when the two
conflict."'8 Why this exception is drawn he doesn't really say, but in
puzzling through both what his reasons might be and what the
exception implies, his account of conventionalism and legitimacy
becomes more clear.
That the plain text trumps moral principle does not trouble
Markovits because, he says, after the Reconstruction amendments the
plain meaning of the text of the U.S. Constitution has not been at
odds with liberal principle (with the possible exception that the way
the Senate is elected violates political equality). At first read, I was
incredulous. Surely the liberal principle of equal concern and respect
would recognize a moral right to a list of basic needs, and surely a
legal right to such a list is not supported by the plain meaning of our
constitutional text. But Markovits is not afraid to go where his
argument leads. On his interpretation, the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments recognize a legal right to a minimum income, among
other things.9
I would rejoice to discover that Markovits is right that the plain
text of the U.S. Constitution supports the positive requirements of
liberal equality. But an adequate account of legitimate moral argument in the United States requires an account of legitimate moral
argument. If he hopes to offer the more general account, he has to
test his view against cases, perhaps counterfactual, where the plain
meaning of a constitutional text is at odds with a culture's moral
commitments.
So suppose, upon reading and thoughtfully deliberating about
Markovits's work, the requisite supermajorities of Congress and the
state legislatures ratified the following constitutional amendment:
Neither the Ninth Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment
nor any other provision of this Constitution shall be construed as

7.
8.
416 n.2,
9.

LLA, supra note 1, at 427.
MOP, supra note 1, at 87; see also id. at 74-78, 389 n.31; LLA, supra note 1, at 415 n.1,
427 n.13, 434.
See MOP, supra note 1, at 4, 132.
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establishing a legal right of any person to be provided with food,
shelter, education, medical care, or a minimum income.
Anthropologists get to work to see if this signals a giant change
in the moral commitments of American society but discover that
moral beliefs and practices remain as they were. As shown both in
what people say and in how they treat each other, America is still a
moral rights culture, a moral right to something like equal concern
and respect is still widely recognized, and the priority of moral rights
over moral goods is still widely acknowledged. Most people, however,
think that not every moral right need be or even should be enforced
by a corresponding legal right. Says one native informant, "Lying
ordinarily violates the moral rights of others, but I wouldn't want to
put ordinary liars in jail." Says another, "Everyone has a moral right
to a decent job, which is why our macroeconomic policies should aim
to minimize unemployment. But a constitutional right to a job? That
doesn't follow." Says a third, "In our town, we like to keep taxes low
and voluntarism high. We collect more than enough charitable
contributions to keep our shelters and clinics running. No one's come
in yet demanding government soup." So when confronted with
Markovits's interpretation of the Constitution, a clear majority of the
American people hurried to bring the text in line with what they
thought it meant all along.
What is Markovits's account to make of this? First, there is no
ambiguity about what the amended Constitution says. Plain text
understood by its ratifiers trumps a culture's moral commitments, so
whatever we say about moral principle in America, with the
amendment in place there is no constitutional right to a minimum
income. To what principle is this culture morally committed?
Markovits could say that the principle is the same one that led him
before the amendment to find a constitutional right to a minimum
income, and the amendment is simply the sort of anomaly that we
should expect when we observe actual moral beliefs and practices.
Alas, this "non-fit" has been written into the plain text of the
Constitution, and the plain text trumps, so now this culture's
constitutional law and its moral commitments are seriously out of
line.
Questions abound. Is this law morally legitimate law? What is
the view of legitimate law that makes the plain meaning of
constitutional text understood by its ratifiers legitimate, no matter
how inconsistent with the only source of moral legitimacy Markovits
has identified, a culture's moral commitments? If this law is not
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morally legitimate law, but nonetheless valid law, how does
Markovits's account of law open up space between validity and
legitimacy? 10 And if there is space for valid but illegitimate law, why is
the sole occupant of that space plain constitutional text? What about
plain statutory text at odds with moral principle?
Markovits might say, instead, that the anthropologists have
uncovered an inconsistency so serious that one must conclude that
American culture is not (and previously was not) committed to a
coherent moral principle. But this is much too strong. One could
think that the stand this culture has taken on the connection between
moral rights and legal rights is a substantive moral mistake (though,
on the conventionalist view, there is no place to stand and say that it
is a mistake for them). But the view that a moral right does not entail
a moral duty to enact a corresponding legal right is not incoherent.
Surely, the view that a moral right does not entail that there already is
a corresponding legal right is not incoherent. A culture, whether or
not it is a moral rights culture, can be morally committed to a number
of coherent views that take a number of different stands on the
connection between its morality and its law.
It is precisely here that Markovits's view is in danger of coming
apart. As a matter of descriptive anthropology, a culture can have
moral commitments to both substantive values and moral commitments to what counts as morally legitimate law. In the Republic of
Razland, children are schooled in the works of Joseph Raz and so
grow up committed to both political values that are liberal and to a
view of legitimate law that is positivistic. The laws of Razland are
liberal, but judges decide what the law is by appealing to legal
sources, not to moral principles. Anthropological study shows both
that ordinary Razians appeal to moral rights in their everyday
dealings and that they make a clear distinction between the legal
rights that they do have and the legal rights that they should have.
When legal rulings are inconsistent with liberal principle, they
typically do not complain that the judges have made a mistake about
the law; they complain that the law or the constitution needs fixing.
Now, one might hold that the two commitments of the Razians
are inconsistent (though I do not). But if they are, this is no simple
10. His view on whether there is space between validity and legitimacy is hard to pin down.
He allows that an argument may be "morally illegitimate" but "internally correct." LLA, supra
note 1, at 415 n.1. But he calls textual arguments that trump moral commitments "legitimate."
See MOP, supra note 1, at 380 n.31. At another point, he says that the moral illegitimacy of an
argument renders it legally irrelevant. See LLA, supra note 1, at 420.
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error that interpretive license can explain away and tidy up, it is no
glaring contradiction that makes their social practices absurd, and,
whether or not mistaken, it surely counts as a moral view. Razian
culture is genuinely committed both to substantive liberalism and to
legal positivism. If Markovits is serious about his conventionalism, he
must concede that both commitments have genuine normative force
for the Razians. Morality, for a conventionalist, is a matter of
convention.
Perhaps Markovits holds that only substantive moral values and
principles are a matter of cultural convention, but the moral legitimacy of laws is not a matter of cultural convention. There are no
culturally-independent correct answers to the questions "What are
one's moral obligations in this culture?" and "When is an action
morally justified in this culture?" but there are culturally-independent
correct answers to the questions "When do legal decisions generate
moral obligations in this culture?" and "When are legal decisions
morally justified in this culture?"
On this view, what would have to be the case about moral
philosophy and anthropology to get the right answer thesis from
Markovits's starting point?
(1) Substantive moral obligations are what cultural conventions say
they are.
(2) Morally legitimate laws are not what cultural conventions say
they are. Preconventional morality requires that law conform to
substantive moral convention.
(3) By convention, the United States is a moral rights culture.
Therefore:
(4) To be morally legitimate, U.S. law must conform to moral rights.
This, however, is not a stable view. For if there is a preconventional spot from which one can conclude that a legal decision lacks
genuine moral legitimacy even though the culture considers it to be
morally legitimate (premise 2), then from that same spot one can
conclude that a descriptive moral principle does not morally obligate,
even though the culture considers it to morally obligate. And if there
is no spot from which a culture's substantive moral conventions can
be judged to be mistakes about genuine moral obligation (premise 1),
then why think that there is a spot from which a culture's conventions
about the connections between morality and law can be judged to be
mistakes?
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Consider, then, another route to the right answer thesis:
(1) Substantive moral obligations are what cultural conventions say
they are.
(2) Morally legitimate laws also are what cultural conventions say
they are.
(3) By convention, the United States is a moral rights culture.
(4) By convention, legitimate law in the United States conforms to
moral rights.
Therefore:
(5) To be morally legitimate, U.S. law must conform to moral rights.
The problem here is that the conclusion is too contingent on the
anthropological facts. If the conclusion that our society is morally
committed to making moral argument the dominant form of legal
argument depends on the empirical observation that our society is
morally committed to making moral argument the dominant form of
legal argument, then the view has much less generality, and much less
need for jurisprudential argument, than Markovits supposes. How to
explain the plain text trump? More refined anthropological
observation leads to this modification:
(4') By convention, legitimate law in the United States conforms to
moral rights (except when the plain text of the Constitution does
not conform to moral rights).
Therefore:
(5') To be morally legitimate, U.S. law must conform to moral rights
(except when the plain text of the Constitution does not conform
to moral rights).
Premise 4' may be empirically true, but it is not the sort of
explanation that explains.
It is time to say more about an idea central to Markovits's view,
moral legitimacy. It is useful to distinguish the concept of moral
legitimacy from particular conceptions of moral legitimacy, and to
distinguish the concept of moral legitimacy from other related
concepts. The concept of moral legitimacy, roughly, is morally
justified authorship (typically, but not only, the morally justified
power, in the Hohfeldian sense, to create morally relevant
institutional facts). Moral legitimacy is a property that not only laws
can have or fail to have, but is also a property of governments,
institutions, practices, procedures, policies, actors, actions, reasons,
and arguments. A conception of moral legitimacy offers conditions
and criteria for what counts as morally legitimate. So, the proposition
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that rulers are morally legitimate if and only if they have been
anointed by god is a conception of moral legitimacy. The proposition
that rulers are morally legitimate if and only if they have been elected
in free and fair elections under a just constitution is a competing
conception of the same concept. The concept itself makes no essential
reference to a procedure, so "a law is morally legitimate if and only if
it is morally good" is a possible conception. But neither does the
concept make an essential reference to substantive goodness, justness,
or all-things-considered moral correctness. Particular conceptions of
moral legitimacy of course might specify either some procedure or
some substantive attribute or both as necessary or sufficient
conditions.
Moral legitimacy is usefully distinguished from two other
concepts, moral rightness or justice, on the one hand, and validity, on
the other. On some conceptions, these concepts are coextensive: one
could hold the view that a law is valid if and only if it is morally
legitimate, and that a law is morally legitimate if and only if it is
substantively just. But the three concepts pick out three different
properties that a law can have.
The concept of valid law makes no essential reference to moral
justification. The concept of valid law refers simply to the institutional
fact of the matter of what counts as the law for those who are subject
to it. One could argue that built into the concept of legal validity is
the claim of moral legitimacy. This may be so, but a claim of moral
legitimacy is not yet moral legitimacy." On particular conceptions of
legal validity, laws are valid only if they are morally legitimate or only
if they are just. But valid law doesn't just mean morally legitimate law
or just law. A natural lawyer and a legal positivist disagree about
what counts as valid law, but they agree about what they are
disagreeing about.
Why am I going on about this? Because much of Markovits's
account is more plausible if read as offering a conception of valid law
that is conditioned on a culture's beliefs about moral legitimacy than
if read as offering a conception of morally legitimate law.
If validity is an institutional fact, it depends on shared understandings. It is quite plausible to suppose that cultures would include
a shared understanding of moral legitimacy as a condition of legal
validity, even if such a condition is not a formal requirement for
11. Unlike Raz, I think that validity and legitimacy can be pried apart without reducing
valid law to effective threat. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 146-59 (1979).
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having a shared understanding about valid law. But what a culture
considers to be morally legitimate is not, by itself, morally legitimate.
Cultural understandings about moral legitimacy can be mistaken. The
correct conception of moral legitimacy could be conditioned on
substantive justice of a certain sort. For example, I believe that the
correct conception of morally legitimate law includes: "a law is
morally legitimate only if it does not severely violate the equal
political liberties or severely violate basic human rights." A culture
that has the correct conception of substantive justice-commitment to
the correct moral principles-is more likely to have the correct
conception of morally legitimate law as well. In such a culture, as in
any culture, when laws are valid it is because the culture understands
them to be valid-commitment makes it so. Happily, a culture
committed to the correct conception of substantive justice is likely to
count as valid only those laws that have genuine moral legitimacy.
But when laws are morally legitimate, it is because they meet the
substantive and procedural conditions for legitimate law, which do
not depend on the culture understanding them to be the correct
conditions. So Markovits is right to insist that law is not selflegitimating, but not because morally legitimate law has to have the
right connection to a culture's moral principles, but because morally
legitimate law has to have the right connection to the correct moral
principles. To show this, however, rather than to merely assert it,
would require taking on the foundational questions in moral theory
that both I and Markovits have left for another day.

